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THE CONSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY
OF FREESTANDING FEDERALISM
Gillian E. Metzger*
Responding to John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Prob-
lem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003 (2009).
In Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Inter-
pretation, Professor John Manning takes aim at the Rehnquist Court's
practice of invoking freestanding, textually unspecified principles of
federalism as a basis for limiting congressional power. Manning iden-
tifies this practice at work in a number of decisions he terms "the 'new
federalism' cases" - in particular, the clear statement requirement of
Gregory v. Ashcroft;2 the anticommandeering rule of New York v.
United States3 and Printz v. United States;4 and the protection of state
sovereign immunity in state court of Alden v. Maine.' Despite their
diverse subject matter, Manning demonstrates that a central analytic
move in all these decisions is the Court's claim that the Constitution
intended to preserve a system of dual sovereignty; from this general
constitutional purpose the Court then infers restrictions on congres-
sional power that are nowhere stated in the Constitution's text.
According to Manning, such invocation of abstract or freestanding
federalism in constitutional interpretation is fundamentally at odds
with the Court's textualist turn in statutory interpretation. There, the
Court has rejected such general purposive analysis because it fails to
respect legislative process and the reality of legislative compromise.
Manning claims that resort to abstract federalism purposes is similarly
disrespectful of the processes and compromises used to adopt and
amend the Constitution. A key feature of these processes, to his mind,
is their supermajoritarian character and emphasis on state equality,
which allowed small states to extract concessions and force compro-
mise on the Constitution's terms.6 Manning sees evidence of the com-
promises wrought by these processes not only in the historical record
of the Convention, but even more so in the specific terms of the Con-
stitution's text and "the particularity with which the document speci-
Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
1 John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation,
122 HARV L. REV 2003, 2005 (2009).
2 501 U.S. 452, 460 ('99').
3 505 U.S. 144, 161-63 (1992).
4 521 U.S. 898, 918-25 (1997).
527 U.S. 706 (1999).
6 See Manning, supra note i, at 2045-46.
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fies the means through which the federal system is to be established."'
Examining the constitutional text, he concludes "[i]t is . . . hard to deny
that the document presented to the ratifiers embodied quite a number
of careful and rather explicit decisions about the contours of a national
government and its relationship to the states." Moreover, it was these
"particular provisions prescribing varied means of allocating govern-
mental power" that the founders agreed on, not federalism in general.9
Accordingly, "[t]o abstract from the specific compromises reached by
the Convention to their overall purposes would . .. devalue the right
of the relevant stakeholders to invoke . . . participation rights to with-
hold their assent or condition it upon terms."' 0
This attack on resort to general constitutional principles and insis-
tence on greater attention to the implications of constitutional process
and constitutional compromise undergirds much of Manning's recent
scholarship." Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitu-
tional Interpretation is also typical of the Manning oeuvre in the clar-
ity and force of its arguments. Manning carefully and methodically
constructs a powerful case not just against freestanding federalism, but
more broadly against the use of nontextually tethered structural infer-
ences in all constitutional interpretation. Nonetheless, I remain unper-
suaded for two central reasons: First, the fact of constitutional com-
promise simply cannot shoulder the analytic work that Manning
assigns to it. Second, Manning's argument is far more destabilizing to
existing doctrines and long-established practices of constitutional in-
terpretation than he acknowledges, which to my mind counts signifi-
cantly against it. Yet although it does not deliver the knockout blow
to freestanding federalism that he seeks, Manning's article makes a
forceful case for why courts should proceed cautiously when invoking
general federalism principles, and - although Manning does not him-
self explore the point - for why courts may not be the venue in which
consideration of freestanding federalism should primarily occur.
I. THE LIMITED INFERENCES
FROM CONSTITUTIONAL COMPROMISE
Manning forthrightly acknowledges that his argument presumes
that the same assumptions governing statutory interpretation apply in
the constitutional context and that the task for constitutional interpre-
7 Id. at 2048.
8 Id. at 2044-45.
9 Id. at 2052.
10 Id. at 44.
11 See, e.g., John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitu-
tional Texts, 113 YALE L. J. 1663 (2004) [hereinafter Manning, The Eleventh Amendment]; John F.
Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP CT. REV. 223.
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tation "is to try, where possible, to recover or reconstruct a historically
situated understanding of the document adopted pursuant to Articles
V and VII."12 I accept these presumptions here, as well as Manning's
claim that the framers reached and the ratifiers endorsed a number of
compromises on specific means of achieving a federal union. Evidence
from the Constitution's text and the historical record make the latter
fact of constitutional compromise indisputable. The critical question,
however, is the scope of that compromise and, more specifically,
whether the framers and ratifiers intended constitutional provisions
addressing particular aspects of the federal-state relationship to be ex-
clusive. If not, then neither constitutional processes fostering com-
promise nor evidence of actual compromises suffices to discredit re-
course to general federalism principles to resolve federalism disputes to
which the text of the Constitution does not clearly speak.
Manning's argument on this crucial question of exclusivity boils
down to a claim akin to the maxim that the specific trumps the general
- though for Manning, the general ends up wholly obliterated. He
underscores the variety of well-known ways in which the Constitution
addresses particular federalism concerns, ranging from enumeration
and specific limits on both federal and state governments to mecha-
nisms for selecting federal officials and making federal laws that are
structured to protect the states. Manning emphasizes the detailed and
specific character of many of these federalism measures, which he ar-
gues makes it "difficult not to conclude that the founders came to
terms upon a number of particular provisions prescribing varied
means of allocating governmental power, rather than adopting federal-
ism in the abstract."13
I am not convinced that the Constitution's numerous and particu-
lar textual references to federalism are best read to carry such an im-
plication of exclusivity. To some extent, the Constitution's detail re-
flects simply the heightened salience of certain issues at the time the
document was adopted or amended; other provisions, for example on
foreign affairs, were uncontroversial carry-overs from the Articles of
Confederation. 14 That many of these provisions provoked little dis-
cussion at the constitutional or ratification conventions militates
12 Manning, supra note i, at 2038.
13 Id. at 2052; see also Manning, The Eleventh Amendment, supra note ii, at 1733-39 (analo-
gizing to the maxim in arguing that the Eleventh Amendment's precise text contains a negative
implication against state sovereign immunity being extended to other contexts).
14 See, e.g., THORNTON ANDERSON, CREATING THE CONSTITUTION: THE CONVEN-
TION OF 1787 AND THE FIRST CONGRESS 81-82, 10I-I5 (1993) (describing limited discussion
of provisions in Article I, Section io and economic concerns that underlay their adoption); James
E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An "Explanatory" Account of the Eleventh Amendment,
83 CORNELL L. REV 1269, 1323-52 (1998) (arguing that the Eleventh Amendment's phrasing
resulted from a particular concern to shield states from suit on Revolutionary War debt).
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against reading too much into their detailed character. This is all the
more true given the extent to which federalism and the relationship
between the federal government and the states was a central point of
division at the conventions. A separate problem, which Manning ac-
knowledges, is that several of the Constitution's most central provi-
sions addressing federalism are actually quite broad and ambiguous."
He insists that despite their breadth and ambiguity, none of these pro-
visions itself embodies a freestanding federalism norm. Perhaps so,
but the real question is what the inclusion of such provisions signals
about how the compromises contained in the Constitution were under-
stood. To my mind, inclusion of broad and ambiguous provisions
makes it unlikely that the founders intended to preclude all reference
to general federalism purposes and norms. Supporting my skepticism
is the fact that state-centered federalism was the dominant norm at the
time of the Constitution's adoption, and it remained so well into the
nineteenth century.16 Although the Constitution plainly altered that
norm in many significant ways, given this background we might ex-
pect to see clearer statement that general principles of state autonomy
were displaced, even as tools of construction, if that indeed represented
the founders' agreement. The early battles between Federalists and
Anti-Federalists over how strictly to construe the Constitution's grant
of federal power and incursions on the states suggest that in fact no
compromise may have been reached on this point at all."
Manning is doubtful that the history predating the Constitution's
adoption is of much use in limning its federalist meaning, because
"American federalism seems to lack a clear preconstitutional antece-
dent capable of supplying a default position for understanding the di-
vision of governmental powers.""' True, no perfect analogue existed,
but it does not follow that the framers wrote on a blank slate. As
1 Manning primarily notes the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, the
Guarantee Clause, see Manning, supra note i, at 2008, as well as the Tenth Amendment in this
regard, see id. at 2063-65. Another obvious contender is the Spending Clause. See United States
v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1936) (noting early debate between Madison and Hamilton about the
scope of the spending power and its relationship to the enumerated powers outlined in Article I,
Section 8).
16 See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING
OF THE CONSTITUTION 162-68, 201-202 (1996); Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and
Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV 723, 31-32 (1988). Indeed, state-centered fed-
eralism clearly limited the possibilities of change even after the Civil War. See BERNARD
BAILYN ET AL., THE GREAT REPUBLIC 735 41 (1977).
" See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARv. L REV
885, 931-35 (1985) (discussing the Anti-Federalist view that "the Constitution [sh]ould be read
against the background of eighteenth century notions about sovereignty and the behavior of sov-
ereign entities, id. at 931); see also RAKOVE, supra note I6, at ISI-20I (describing the very differ-
ent meanings of federalism voiced in the ratifying conventions).
18 Manning, supra note i, at 2059.
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Manning notes, they had prior experience with two federal systems:
the centralized model of the British Empire and the more state-
centered governance pursued under the Articles of Confederation.
That the framers opted for a new approach in which they "split the
atom of sovereignty"' 9 does not mean these experiences were irrele-
vant. The Constitution did not emerge in a vacuum; instead, it was
drafted and adopted to address repeated failures of government under
the Articles. An awareness of what these failures were is thus helpful
in understanding not only what the framers sought to change, but also
the potential limits of their constitutional compromises. Against the
historical background of the Constitution - both the broader context
of its adoption and the ongoing disputes over federalism at its drafting
and ratification - Manning's inference of exclusivity seems implausi-
ble. More likely is the view that the founders did not understand
themselves to have reached agreement on constitutional federalism's
full contours, but instead expected that the details of constitutional
federalism would be worked out over time.20 In the words of The
Federalist No. 82: "'Tis time only that can mature and perfect so com-
pound a system, can liquidate the meaning of all the parts, and can ad-
just them to each other in a harmonious and consistent WHOLE."21
Similarly problematic for Manning's inference of exclusivity is the
fact that from early on the Supreme Court invoked general principles
in elucidating the Constitution's meaning on matters of federalism.
The most famous example is of course McCulloch v. Maryland's22
derivation of federal immunity from state taxes, relying not on any
specific textual provision but instead on the general principle of federal
supremacy and the representative differences between federal and
state governments. 23 But invocation of general structural principles is
evident even as early as Chisholm v. Georgia,24 where several justices
invoked constitutional purposes and general arguments about the na-
ture of state sovereignty in the federal system to draw conclusions
about whether state sovereign immunity survived the enactment of Ar-
ticle III.25 In this regard, Manning's denomination of the freestanding
federalism analysis he targets as the "new federalism" is somewhat un-
fortunate, as it obscures the lengthy pedigree of this approach. Such
19 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
20 See Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence, and
Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733, 1796 (2005).
21 THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, at 490 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999); see
also The FEDERALIST No. 37 (James Madison), supra, at 225.
22 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
23 Id. at 425-37 (181Q); see also Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (ii Wall.) 113 (1871).
24 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
25 Manning himself describes the general and broad tenor of the arguments in Chisholm in a
previous article. See Manning, The Eleventh Amendment, supra note ii, at 1674-80.
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early judicial practice - also manifested in the political branches26
is hard to square with the claim that the framers and ratifiers intended
their compromises on specific aspects of the federal-state relationship
to preclude reference to more abstract precepts in federalism disputes.
Despite his insistence to the contrary, it is not clear that Manning
ultimately rests his argument for exclusivity on how the framers actu-
ally understood the scope of their compromises. Instead, his argument
seems fundamentally to rest on a functional assessment that a default
rule of exclusivity is more likely to preserve compromises than an in-
terpretive approach that allows shifting in levels of generality. As
Manning revealingly says, "constitutionmakers, like other lawmakers,
necessarily make judgments, whether conscious or not, about the level
of generality at which they wish to frame their policies." 27  He also
emphasizes that shifting to general purposes ignores that legislators of-
ten bargain about means as well as ends and may have multiple, con-
flicting purposes.2 8 There is of course an irony here, in that such gen-
eral presumptions about legislative and constitutional processes seem
very close to the type of abstract presuppositions that Manning himself
is attacking. In any event, however, such a functional argument is in-
complete. A default rule or presumption against shifting levels of gen-
erality will inevitably err on the side of overprotecting textual com-
promises, just as a presumption of nonexclusivity will have the
opposite effect. What is needed, therefore, is an account of why the
systemic benefits of respecting compromise justify the costs of overpro-
tection. Moreover, it is at this juncture that the analogy between con-
stitutional and statutory interpretation is weakest. Several features of
the constitutional context - the greater difficulty of amendment,
greater risk of dead-hand governance, and greater need for flexibility
in fundamental arrangements - may yield a different calculus of costs
and benefits than that which applies to statutory interpretation.
II. STRUCTURAL INFERENCE IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
This brings me to my second point, the destabilizing implications of
Manning's article for constitutional doctrine and our established prac-
tices of constitutional interpretation. As Manning notes, the Court jus-
tifies its invocation of general federalism principles as a form of struc-
26 Both Hamilton and Jefferson invoked general nontextual principles as well as specific con-
stitutional provisions in their reports on the constitutionality of a national bank. See Alexander
Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act To Establish a Bank (Feb. 23, 1791), in 8
THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER 97, III (Harold C. Syrett ed. 1965); Thomas Jefferson, Opinion
on the Constitutionality of a National Bank(Feb. 1:5, 191), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 284, 289 (Paul Leicester Ford ed. 1895).
27 Manning, supra note i, at 2045 (emphasis added).
28 Id. at 2I6- 17, 2039-40.
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tural reasoning, wherein (as famously described by Charles Black) in-
ferences about constitutional meaning are drawn not directly from
specific constitutional text but from the structures and relationships
the Constitution creates. 2 9  Manning's criticism of resort to atextual
purposes and generality shifting would seem to call the legitimacy of
this basic form of constitutional interpretation into question across the
board.
To his credit, Manning acknowledges this implication, and his re-
sponse is to distinguish among different forms of structural reasoning.
In particular, he contends that what differentiates the "new federalism"
cases is not just their invocation of general principles at best immanent
in constitutional text, but rather that they "tease out a general purpose
(federalism) from multiple discrete provisions that implement that
background purpose in relatively precise ways. This approach, which
[could be] characterized as multiclause holism, inevitably shifts the
level of generality at which those provisions express their purpose."30
Manning contrasts this approach, when "the overall structure takes on
a life of its own,"1 to instances in which reference to other constitu-
tional text is used to illuminate the meaning of a particular clause or
structural provision. 32
Unfortunately, Manning's argument succeeds neither in vindicating
the technique of structural inference nor in distinguishing these feder-
alism decisions from other structural precedent. What the technique
of structural inference uniquely offers is the ability to take a more ho-
listic view and situate a particular dispute against an overall structural
framework. Manning's uniclausal approach saves the technique by
removing exactly this feature and reducing structural inference to a
loose form of textualism. Moreover, I disagree with Manning's claim
that many of the major constitutional decisions engaging in structural
reasoning have the uniclausal character he desires. In Marbury v.
Madison,33 for example, Chief Justice Marshall derived the power of
judicial review from general understandings of the judicial function
and the nature of a written constitution, along the way referencing the
Supremacy, Arising Under, and Oath Clauses.34 The opinions in the
Steel Seizure Case3 invoke provisions of Article I as well as Article II,
and their prime analytic thrust comes from broad conceptions of the
29 CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
7 (1969).
30 Id. at 2068.
31 Id.
32 See id. at 2067-68.
5 U.S. (i Cranch) 137 (1803).
34 Id. at 78 -8o.
35 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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relationship of the executive and legislative branches. 3 6 Other major
presidential power decisions similarly turn on general separation of
powers principles that are not rooted in particular clauses.37 Even de-
cisions that do appear more uniclausal, such as INS v. Chadha38 with
its focus on the Bicameralism and Presentment Clause, are fundamen-
tally animated by general visions of the meaning of constitutional
separation of powers.39 Federalism is the other main constitutional
context in which structural reasoning predominates, and as noted
above, the Court has a longstanding practice of invoking freestanding
federalism in resolving disputes about the scope of federal and state
powers or immunities. 40
Although I share Manning's concerns that broad structural infer-
ence raises real dangers of indeterminacy and untethered judicial dis-
cretion, I believe that it can also yield helpful insights about the nature
of our constitutional order.41 Regardless, to the extent that Manning's
argument would foreclose this well-established method of constitu-
tional reasoning, to my mind the costs associated with such a disrup-
tion to settled practice and precedent outweigh the asserted benefits of
respecting constitutional processes and compromise. Manning's failure
to fully address and justify these costs is a significant weakness in his
argument.
III. THE VENUE FOR FREESTANDING FEDERALISM
In my view, Manning's most potent critique of freestanding federal-
ism is his emphasis on the fact that our constitutional federal structure
is animated by two cross-cutting purposes. The Constitution aimed
36 See, e.g., id. at 587-88; id. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
37 See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 697-706 (1997) (discussing the role of the President
and the relationship between the President and the judicial branch in the course of rejecting a
categorical rule that would require all private actions be stayed until the President leaves office);
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974) (concluding that absolute executive privilege
against subpoenas "would upset the constitutional balance of 'a workable government' and
gravely impair the role of the courts under Art. III"); see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,
685-96 (1988) (analyzing not simply whether the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in
Government Act of 1978 violated the Appointments Clause and Article III, but in addition
whether it was "invalid under the constitutional principle of separation of powers," id. at 685).
38 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
39 See id. at 951 (emphasizing the Constitution's division of powers into three distinct
branches and the role of the President as a check on Congress in holding that the legislative veto
violated the Bicameralism and Presentment Clause of Article I, § 7).
40 Manning's approach would also destabilize such nonconstitutional federalism-driven doc-
trines as the presumption against preemption and abstention. Indeed, the presumption against
preemption may be the most prominent invocation of freestanding federalism today. For a recent
dispute over its use, compare Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 544 (2008), with id. at
555-59 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
41 See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 HARV L.
REV. 1468, 1476 (2007).
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not only to preserve a meaningful autonomous role for the states, but
also to significantly expand national power. The need to harmonize
two such central and opposed purposes poses particular challenges for
freestanding federalism analysis. It is hard to see how general federal-
ism principles are likely to do any real work in resolving federalism
disputes unless they are invoked in a form that is partial and therefore
inadequate - as in the new federalism cases Manning analyzes, in
which prime attention is paid to the way the Constitution preserves
state autonomy and the nationalist side of the equation gets short
shrift.
Manning concludes that freestanding federalism simply does not
exist as a meaningful constitutional concept: "[M]ediation of the ten-
sion between the pro-federalism and nationalizing impulses must be
found in the particulars through which the balance was struck."42
This view resonates with scholarship arguing that the best role for fed-
eral courts in the federalism context may be to ensure that national in-
stitutions - administrative agencies as well as Congress - give ade-
quate consideration to state autonomy concerns, rather than to directly
devise the appropriate balance between national and state interests. 43
Such an account highlights an interesting distinction between Gregory
and the other new federalism cases on which Manning focuses. Al-
though all invoke freestanding federalism, Gregory does so to justify
the imposition of process requirements on Congress to ensure that
Congress intended to burden state autonomy, whereas the others do so
to justify imposing more categorical prohibitions on Congress.44
To be sure, enforcing federalism through such judicial policing of
national decisionmaking practices does not wholly avoid the indeter-
minacy Manning identifies in freestanding federalism. Even if respon-
sibility for balancing national and state interests in concrete contexts
lies now with the political branches, it is still necessary to explain how
federalism principles yield such judicially enforced process require-
ments, particularly given the separation of powers concerns that such
requirements risk excessive judicial interference in the internal work-
ings of other branches. The reason to pursue this route, rather than
42 Manning, supra note I, at 2057.
43 See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J.
2023, 2063-69, 2104-07 (2008) (advocating subjecting federal agency decisions that impose sub-
stantial burdens on the states to more searching hard look review and noting this approach in re-
cent decisions); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEx. L. REV. I,
123-54 (2004) (advocating greater attention to process constraints on Congress as a means of ad-
vancing federalism concerns).
44 I do not want to exaggerate this point; clear statement requirements of the Gregory variety
can be potent obstacles to congressional action, whereas conditional spending offers a mechanism
by which Congress can avoid the limitations of New York, Printz, and Alden. But whether or not
it is manifested in practice, this is an analytic distinction worth noting.
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follow Manning's path and rest content with simply enforcing the par-
ticular national-state arrangements evident in the Constitution, is that
those arrangements have been overtaken by events. The world we live
in today is one characterized by not just a national economy but a
global one, and an ever-expanding federal administrative state. To
conclude, as Manning does, that general federalism principles have no
constitutional bearing that necessitates adaptations to this reality is to
take the courts largely out of the federalism business. Perhaps that
would be the best approach; certainly, it has had its advocates over the
years. 45 But we should be under no illusions that we can cast aside
freestanding federalism analysis and retain meaningful judicial en-
forcement of federalism today.
45 See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL
PROCESS 171 -259 (1980).
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